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WAS EINSTEIN A LAPLACEAN? 
Jack Horner 
It is surely a truism that the science and 
philosophy of an age influence one another, and this 
century has been no exception: the rise of the quantum 
theory profoundly threatened the most promising and 
universally respected conception of the physical world 
articulated since the demise of the Aristotelian 
doctrines of nature. In so doing, this bold theory 
precipitated one of natural philosophy's most dramatic 
disputes, between two of the century's most 
distinguished physicists, Niels Bohr and Albert 
Einstein. 
It is widely believed that the dynamics of this 
dialogue were dictated by an overview of "physical 
reality" held by Einstein. Such interpretations 
typically presume that Einstein's arguments in that 
exchange depend on a rather demanding constellation of 
epistemic and metaphysical theses reminiscent of the 
doctrines of Laplace. Central to these doctrines is 
the belief that every state variable of a physical 
system has a knowable, exact value at all times. The 
aim of this essay is to argue that even though there is 
something essentially correct in such an approach to 
understanding the Einsteinian Weitanschauung, the 
method is at least suspect and at best obscures the 
subtlety of Einstein's convictions. 
I 
At the outset, we can sharply distinguish at least 
two approaches to the problem of understanding 
Einstein's view of quantum-mechanicaj (QM) reality. 
The first approach, taken by Hooker, Lenzen; and 
Furry? is to hold that there are no interpretations of 
Einstein's pronouncements more epistemical1y or 
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metaphysically parsimonious relative to the entire body 
of his writings than the Laplacean. The second 
approach, in contrast, is to try to discover an 
interpretation which is epistemically and 
metaphysically more parsimonious. 
Now the first of these approaches, though 
relatively easy, is problematic. For if there is an 
interpretation of Einstein's assertions which is more 
parsimonious than the Laplacean, any of Einstein's 
arguments which employ premises affected by this more 
parsimonious interpretation will be stronger under that 
interpretation than those same arguments under the 
Laplacean. Since it is a maxim of philosophic 
methodology to adopt that interpretation which extracts 
maximal, cogency, I shall opt for the second method; 
though the more difficult, it is the more sympathetic. 
II 
The most detailed formulation of Einstein's 
concerns over the quantum theory (QT), it is generally 
agreed, occurs in a paper published in Physical 
Review. The content of that paper, now known as the 
i»Epp?r~ (EJnstein-Podolsky-Rosen) argument, is designed 
to show that the QT is not "complete," in the sense 
that there are describable physical situations which 
the QT must in principle ignore. 
The story goes something like this. Let us suppose 
that there is a theory-independent "physical reality" 
which a "complete" physical theory must in some sense 
mirror (Einstein, p. 777): 
(C) Every element of physical reality must 
have a counterpart in the theory. 
Naturally, in order to determine whether the QT in 
particular satisfies C, a means of determining the 
"elements of reality" independently of the theory must 
be provided. This task, the argument maintains, can be 
accomplished by an appeal to the results of experiment 
and measurement, and more specifically (Einstein, p. 
777), 
(R) If without in any way disturbing a 
system we can predict with certainty 
(i.e., with probability equal to unity) 
the value of a physical quantity, then 
there exists an element of physical 
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reality corresponding to this physical 
quanti ty. 
Using criteria C and R, respectively dubbed the 
"criterion of completeness" and the "criterion of 
reality," the argument then tries to show that there is 
a system in a physical state S which can be predicted 
with certainty even though S cannot be described by QT; 
hence the QT is reckoned "incomplete." 
On the surface, at any rate, EPR certainly do 
appear to be committed to a neo-Laplacean theory of 
physical reality. To determine, however, whether this 
appearance is more than a cosmetic feature of the EPR 
story, it is necessary to look at the argument in more 
detail. 
That detail is to be found in EPR's analysis of an 
apparently embarassing QM system. Suppose that 1 and 
II designate two systems whose joint behavior is 
characterized by a wave function y ; let I and 11 
interact during a time interval 10,T) and be separated 
after T. If the states of I and II are known before T 
= O, N | / " a i l o w s a computation of the state of the complex 
system I + 11 at any time after T, but does not by 
itself afford a means of determining the states of the 
respective "component" systems (1 and 11) of this 
complex. Thus the states of the component systems can 
be determined, if at all, only with the help of 
measurement. 
Now the QT asserts that the measuring process of 
the complex is to be analyzed in the following way. If 
a, , a z , aj, . . . are the eigenvalues of a physical 
quantity A of system I and u, (x y), u 2 ( X | ) , U J ( X J ) , . 
are the corresponding eigenfunctions of A (where x 
stands for the variables used to describe system 1), 
then^p" takes the form 
where the yV (x x )"''are merely coefficients of the 
expansion of ^ into a series of orthogonal functions u„ 
(x. ). If A is measured in I after T and found to have 
value a^, the QT implies that I is left in the state 
given by Uj<(x,), and II is left in the state given by 
\//"K (xA ) with certainty. 
If on the other hand B / A is a physical quantity 
with eigenvalues b ( , b2, bj, . . . with corresponding 
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eigen functions Vj(x f), v a(xj), Vj(xj), . . . , takes 
the fo ftn go 
where again the (x t ) are coefficients of the 
expansion of Y into a series of orthogonal functions vj 
(X; ). And again. if B is measured in I after T and 
found to have value b r , the QT implies, as in (.1), that 
system 1 is in state v r(xj) and II is in state q*>(x2) 
with certainty. 
Thus, depending on what physical quantity in I is 
measured, II is assigned two wave functions, *p*V(xz ) 
and <pr{*z), respectively, with certainty. Since I and 
II are separated after T, measurement in 1 does not 
disturb 11, and the criterion of reality implies thatlfj". 
(x 2) and (fV(x2) have simultaneous reality. 
In particular, then, suppose that the two wave 
functions ^(xi ) and <p r(x z) are eigenfunctions of two 
noncommuting physical. quantities, P and Q, 
respectively. The above remarks imply (Einstein, p. 
779-00) that by measuring the value of P or Q in system 
I, the value of P and Q in II can be determined to have 
simultaneous reality. 
And now, the ruh. QM implies that if the operators 
corresponding to two physical quantities A and B do not 
commute, then precise knowledge of one of them forbids 
precise knowledge of the other. Since the analysis of 
I •»• If shows that the values of P and Q can be 
determined with certainty, they can, by R, have 
simultaneous reality. But the QT precludes this 
possibility. Hence, the QT is by C incomplete. 
On the surface the EPR analysis looks very tight. 
It respects the QM formalism and adheres to the QM 
theory of measurement. Yet in spite of this, it seems 
to show tfiat there are "elements of reality" whose 
existence the QT ignores. We thus seem faced with two 
rather awkward choices: to admit an embarrassing 
lacuna in QM or to suspect that there is an evasive 
non-QM assumption in the argument. In the following, 1 
will try to show there is a problem of the latter sort 
and that this problem discloses a subtlety of the 
Einsteinian view badly obscured by the Laplacean 
analysi s. 
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III 
In the heart of the EPR argument lies an apparently 
innocent, but in fact quite troublesome assumption 
(Einstein, p. 770): 
(S) If two quantum systems have interacted 
and have been subsequently separated, 
measurement of one of them does not 
disturb the other in ways which in 
principle assign a probability of less 
than unity to the prediction of the 
value of some physical quantity. 
This thesis, which will be called the "separability" 
postulate, is essential for the success of the EPR 
argument. For if S did not hold, measurement on 1 
could influence physical magnitudes in II in such a way 
that in principle they could not be predicted with 
certainty. A condition of the criterion of reality 
would then fail to be met and the argument would 
collapse. 
7 
Now it has frequently been asserted that, more 
than any other feature of the EPR argument, the 
separability postulate reveals or depends on the 
Laplacean conviction that 
(L) Every physical magnitude has a 
knowable, exact value at all times. 
The argument connecting L and S goes something like 
this. Einstein frequently asserted that every physical 
magnitude has a knowable, exact value at all times (L). 
Thus an adequate theory of interaction cannot in 
principle forbid the meaningful ascription, with 
certainty, of exact values to physical magnitudes (S). 
Although it is probably true that there is some 
interpretation of L which would imply the separability 
postulate, it is hardly so clear that the EPR argument 
need rest on anything so strong as that Laplacean 
canon. And if not, then the claim that the EPR 
argument must turn on such a view simply does not 
stand. 
Let me first argue, then, that EPR can get by on an 
interpretation of S much weaker than L. In particular, 
it would suffice for EPR to assume merely that: 
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(Sp) If P and Q are Noncommuting parameters, 
the probablitity of finding that P has 
value p in II, given that Q has been 
measured in I and found to have value 
q, is just the classical conditional 
probability. Moreover, the probability 
that Q has value g in II, given that P 
has been measured in I and found to 
have value p, is likewise the classical 
conditional one. 
How does the argument go with S p substituted for S? 
Well, whatever we might mean by "isolating" a physical 
system K from another, a minimal (necessary) condition 
of such, it would seem, would be that the conditional 
probability of some observable Q having value q in K 
would simply be the classical one. Sp precludes the 
only problematic possibility along these lines in the 
context of the EPR argument; hence the argument 
follows, provided it did before. 
Notice that Sp does not require that the 
noncommuting observables P and Q have definite values 
at all times. Indeed, even if P and Q did not have 
definite values at any time, the conclusion of EPR 
would still stand under Sp. Moreover, L entails Sp but 
not the converse. And clearly, the epistemic and 
metaphysical commitments of Sp are fewer than those of 
I.. Thus Sp is an epistemically and metaphysically more 
parsimonious interpretation of S than I,, relative to 
the body of Einstein's beliefs and the conclusion of 
the EPR argument. 
Yet even though S can be interpreted in such a way 
(Sp) that the metaphysical and epistemic promiscuity of 
I. is avoided, it seems that there must nevertheless be 
some justice in the view that S in a significant 
presupposition of the EPR argument about the nature of 
physical reality. But however obvious on t?»e surface, 
this remark requires careful formulation and defense 
because some authors have raised serious questions 
about whether it makes sense to say such a thing. 
In particular, there is a very serious problem 
which must be avoided if we are to assert that the 
claim Sp makes an assertion about physical reality. 
For the notion of "saying something about physical 
reality" seems to entail, if not be entailed by, 
"having empirical content." And, as Hempel and other.s 
have shown, there are grave difficulties in attempting 
to say that a sentence simpliciter has empirical 
content. For, given any sentence A, it is always 
possible to construct a theory T tinder which we would 
want to assert that A had no empirical content and a 
theory T 1 under which we would want to assert that A 
did have empirical content. 
Hempel's arguments strongly intimate that by 
relativizing the notion of empirical content to a set 
of sentences, we can get at least a sufficient 
criterion for it. I shall accordingly, and I hope 
unproblematically, assume that a sentence A has 
empirical content relative to a set E U B of sentences 
If E U B and EU I A J are each consistent, BpA, E XTB F" 
-A and if the in-principle testable consequences of E 
(J {a } differ from the in-principle testable 
consequences of EU B. I take to be "testable" whatever 
the scientific community claims is testable. In this 
sense, then, I wish to argue that the separability 
postulates Sp has empirical content relative to the 
remainder of the EPR argument and the QT theory of 
probability, and hence discloses something about 
Einstein's implicit commitments concerning the nature 
of physical reality. 
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The argument given here is inspired by Furry, who 
ironically believed that it showed that Einstein was 
(mistakenly) committed to L. Consider in particular 
two once-interacting systems I and II, whose joint 
state (i.e., the state of the complex I +• II) can be 
characterized by A 
where \k^*1 ^ a r e e i 9 e i l f u n c ' - i o n s °f a n observable L 
with corresponding eigenvalues X^JXj are the variables 
describing 1, the rn (x 2) are the eigenfunctions of an observable R with corresponding eigenvaluespK , and 
x 2 are the variables describing II. Let M and S be two observables, neither of which is equivalent to L or S. 
Let M have eigenvalues 14, and eigenfunctions vu. and 
let S have eigenfunctions T)q- with eigenvalues O" 
Suppose that M has been measured in I in a large number 
of similarly prepared pairs of systems and found to 
have value \j! in some of them. 
Assume now that the probability of S having value 
CT in II, given that M has value ix' in I, is just the 
classical conditional probability (Sf ). To compute 
this, we note that the fraction having value \j! for M 
in I is given by 
(4) 
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The fraction giving \x' ( 1for M in I and having II in 
state £q is CJKj<t>\.v 1 Mx'\ Then the fraction giving 
values for M and K<j'for S is 2 
^ w . | ( % ' % ) r | ( ^ » 
Dividing k(5) by (4), we obtain the classical 
conditional probability that S has value CT, in II, 
given that M has been found to have value jX for M in 
— hand, if On the other' we suppose that the 
probability of S having value O"' in II, given .that M 
has value [X* in I, is not the classical conditonal 
probability (thus denying ), we have to find some 
other way to calculate the requisite probability. QM 
supplies the only natural answer in this context, to 
w.i t . 
K 
Normalizing this function and taking the square root of 
its inner product with I^rj*, we obtain the desired 
noncl ass ica l_cond.it.\onal probability 
(8) 
:al conditional probability Nii 
The discrepancyK between the probability given by 
(6) and that given by (8) arises from the fact that 
after M is measured in I, the QT formally assigns a 
pure state to 11 which in general is not one of the£p« 
And, since the only pure states generable^ny 
man.ipula.tion of the coefficientsOJ^are contained in the 
set of rpjf. , there is no way that the formal statistics 
predicted under assumption Sf substituted for S in the 
EPR argument in general will agree with the wave-
function determination of probability substituted for 
S. On the criterion of empirical content defined 
above, then, if the statistics characterized by (6) and 
(8) testab.ly~d*i.ffer, Sp has empirical content relative 
to the rest of the EPR argument and the QM theory of 
probability. 
The question thus arises whether the statistics 
determined by (6) and (8) testably differ. This is no 
mere pedantic worry, or it may be that the formal 
discrepancies between (6) and (8) present no testable 
di fference. 
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To parody Mill, I know of no better way to show 
that something is testable than to show that it has 
been tested. A test of an EPR experiment has been made 
by Wu and Shaknovf among others, and it goes like 
this. When two photons are emitted in opposite 
directions in the annihilation of a positron-electron 
pair, the QT predicts that they will have perpendicular 
polarizations and that these polarizations cannot be 
simultaneously determined with precision. 
To confirm these predictions, a source of slow 
positrons is covered with a foil sufficiently thick to 
guarantee annihilation of them all. The foil-covered 
source is placed at the center of a lead shpere which 
has had a narrow hole drilled along one of its 
diameters. Aluminum or carbon scatterers are placed at. 
the ends of this channel. Photons scattered through 
about 90* by one of these scatterers are recorded by a 
counter at a known azimuth, while those scattered at 
the other end are recorded by a counter in coincidence 
with the first. By measuring the coincidence counting 
rates with different relative azimuths, the 
perpendicular correlation of polarization can be 
determined. These correlations, Wheeler'*' has 
theoretically shown, discriminate rather sharply 
between (6) and (8). 
The relation of this experiment to the situation 
described by EPR is as follows. If we assume that the 
two photons (say, 1 and II, respectively) are moving in 
the +z and -z directions, the conservation laws of 
parity and momentum imply that the state of 1 < II may 
be wri tten as _ _ — 
H 
where denotes that the k t n photon is right 
circularly polarized and "l/^  denotes that the k 
photon is left circularly polarized. 
We may also write ^ as 
(10) ^= %7^ ( t ' V - ) 
where l//^  denotes that the linear polarization of the k^  
photon is along the x-axis. 
If the circular polarization of photon I is 
measured and found to be in ty* .then the QT implies 
that photon II is in state tyr . But il the linear 
polarization of photon I is measured and 1 is found to 
be state -u/-x , photon II is in state . Thus, 
/i4 
depending on whether the linear or circular 
polarization of photon I was measured, we can predict 
either the linear or circular polarization of photon 
II, respectively. QM says that the linear and circular 
polarizations are non-commuting quantities and hence 
cannot have simultaneously definite values for both 
kinds of polarization. Thus polarization-correlation 
experiments are a particular kind of the class of EPR 
systems. 
The correlation results obtained in the Wu-Shaknov 
experiment and others like it in fact sustain the QM 
picture and disconfirm the EPR prediction under 
assumption S P. Hence Sp has empirical content relative 
to the rest of the EPR argument and the QM theory of 
probability. 
f\ little caution is in order here. The above 
considerations establish at best only that Sp says 
something about Einstein's conception of physical 
reality relative to the rest of the EPR argument and 
the QM theory of probability. These considerations may 
say nothing about whether Sp has empirical content 
relative to theories which diverge from the EPR view, 
and there are obviously several of these. 
I have tried to argue, then, that contrary to a 
popular view of the Einsteinian Weltanschauung, the 
separability postulate of the EPR argumenT. need not 
rest on anything so strong as a Laplacean view of 
physics. Nevertheless, that postulate -- a crucial 
feature of the EPR view — does have relative empirical 
content and hence in some sense reflects Einstein's 
convictions concerning the physical world. 
Unfortunately, the argument used to support this 
latter claim appealed to research which challenges the 
correctness of the postulate. But though contemporary 
investigations should crush the credibility of EPR's 
conclusions, the weakness of the premises under which 
that argument still stands remains testimony to the 
subtlety of the mind which created it. 
Fountain Valley School 
45 
NOTES 
ANiels Bohr, "Can Quantum Mechanical Description of 
Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?" Physical 
Review 46 (1935), pp. 696-702. 
2 
Albert Einstein, B. Podolsky, and N. Rosen, "Can 
Quantum Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be 
Considered Complete?" Physical Review 47 (1935), pp. 
777-00. 
3 
Clifford Hooker, "The Nature of Quantum Mechanical 
Reality: Einstein vs. Bohr," in R. Colodny, ed., 
Paradigms and Paradoxes, Pittsburgh, 1972, pp. 67-302. 
4 
Victor F. Lenzen, "Einstein's Theory of 
Knowledge," in P. A. Schilpp, ed., Albert Einstein: 
Philosopher-Scientist, Open Court, 1970, pp7 357-82. 
5 
W. H. Furry, "Note on the Quantum-Mechanical 
Theory of Measurement," Physical Review 49 (1936), pp. 
393-99; W. H. Furry, "Remarks on Measurement in Quantum 
Theory," Physical Review 49 (1936), p. 476. 
**See note 2. 
7 
See nn. 3 - 5 . 
g 
C. Hempel., "Empiricist Criteria of Cognitive 
Significance," in Aspects of Scientific Explanation, 
The Free Press, pp."101-20. 
9 
See note 5. 
A 0See note 5. 
^ C . S. Wu and 1. Shaknov, "The Angular Correlation 
of Scattered Annihilation Radiation," Physical Review 
77 (1950): 136. " 
46 
12J. A. Wheeler, Ann. New York Acad. Sei. 48 
(1946): 2.19. 
1 3Certain hidden variable theories, for example. 
